We examine the relationship between the organization of a …rm and its ability to adapt to changes in the environment. We show that even if lower-level managers have superior information about their local conditions, and incentive con ‡icts are negligible, a centralized organization can be better at adapting to changes in the environment than a decentralized one. We then show that this result reverses some of the standard intuitions about organizational structure. For instance, an increase in competition that makes adaptation more important can favor centralization over decentralization.
Introduction
The organization theorist Chester Barnard and the economist Friedrich Hayek shared the view that the "economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place" (Hayek, 1945, p.524) . But whereas Hayek viewed adaptation as an autonomous process, undertaken by individual economic actors, Barnard (1938) stressed the ability of organizations to engage in what Oliver Williamson (1996 Williamson ( , 2002 ) calls "coordinated adaptation." Williamson, referring to Barnard and challenging Hayek, argues that:
"Some kind of disturbances require coordinated responses, lest the individual parts operate at cross-purposes or otherwise suboptimize. Failures of coordination may arise because autonomous parties read and react to signals di¤ erently, even though their purpose is to achieve a timely and compatible combined response. [...] The authority relationship (…at) has adaptive advantages over autonomy for transactions of a bilaterally (or multi-laterally) dependent kind " (1996, p.103).
In this paper we explore the relationship between a …rm's organizational structure and its ability to adapt to a changing environment. We ask when adaptation is best achieved in a decentralized organization -through a process of autonomous adaptation as envisioned by Hayek -and when it is best done in a centralized organization -through a process of administrative control and coordinated adaptation, as envisioned by Barnard and Williamson. We address these issues in the context of a multi-divisional …rm whose pro…ts depend only on how the production level of each division is adapted to its local demand conditions. The production decisions can be either strategic complements -if there are increasing returns to aggregate production -or strategic substitutes -if there are decreasing returns. We show that even when division managers have superior information about their local demand conditions, and incentive con ‡icts are negligible, the headquarter manager may be better at adapting production to demand conditions than the division managers. In particular, and in line with Williamson's intuition, a centralized organization is better at adapting to changes in the environment than a decentralized one if production decisions are su¢ ciently interdependent, in a sense that we make precise below.
We show that this result reverses some of the standard intuitions about the organizational structure of …rms. For instance, an increase in competition that makes it more important for …rms to adapt to changes in the environment may actually favor a centralized structure over a decentralized one.
The result that a centralized organization can be better at adapting to changes in the environment than a decentralized one follows from three observations. The …rst is that if decisions are interdependent, adaptation involves both autonomous adaptation -adapting each production decision to its local demand conditions -and coordinated adaptation -adapting each decision to the other production decisions, and through this channel to the demand conditions in the other markets. Coordination is therefore an input into adaptation that allows the decision makers to adapt to demand shocks more aggressively. Moreover, the more interdependent the production decisions, the more important coordinated adaptation becomes relative to autonomous adaptation.
The second observation is that while an organization's ability to engage in autonomous adaptation depends on how much decision makers know about the demand conditions in their respective markets, their ability to engage in coordinated adaptation depends on how much they know about each others' markets. And organization's ability to adapt therefore depends on both the depth and the breadth of the decision makers' information. Moreover, the more interdependent the production decisions, the more important breadth becomes relative to depth.
The …nal observation is that even though each division manager knows more about his market, and therefore has an advantage in terms of depth, the headquarter manager may well know more about the other markets, and thus have an advantage in terms of breadth. This will be the case, for instance, if there are economies to knowledge specialization (Becker and Murphy 1992, Bolton and Dewatripont 1994, and Sims 2002) or if cognitive constraints make it more di¢ cult for division managers to talk to each other than to headquarters (Ferreira and Sah 2011) . And even when there are no economies to knowledge specialization or cognitive constraints, such an information structure can arise naturally when managers communicate with each other strategically, as we will show below.
Together these three observations imply our main result: for su¢ ciently interdependent decisions, a headquarter manager who knows a little bit about all markets is better at adapting production to demand conditions than the division managers who know a lot about their own markets but very little about each others'. Below we …rst establish this result in a model without incentive con ‡icts and in which we take the generalist-specialist information structure as given.
After establishing the result, we then examine its implications and robustness.
Competition and Adaptation:
The …rst issue we explore is the e¤ect of an increase in product market competition on the organization of …rms. It is often argued informally that such an increase in competition favors decentralization. This argument is summarized, for instance, in Tim Harford's recent best-seller "Adapt:" "Thanks to globalisation, businesses have ventured into new and varied markets, where they face intense competition. The traditional purpose of centralisation is to make sure every business unit is coordinated and nobody is duplicating anyone else's e¤ ort [...] . But a centralised organisation doesn't work so well when confronted with a diverse, fast-moving range of markets. The advantage of decentralisation, rapid adaptation to local circumstances, has grown" (pp.75-76).
To explore this argument, we examine an increase in competition that makes demand more price sensitive. In line with the standard intuition, an increase in the price sensitivity of demand makes it more important to adapt production to demand conditions. What the standard intuition overlooks, however, is that an increase in the price sensitivity of demand also changes the process through which decisions are adapted to demand shocks. In particular, the more price sensitive demand, the more interdependent the production decisions, and thus the more important coordinated adaptation and breadth become relative to autonomous adaptation and depth. In our setting, an increase in competition therefore actually favors centralization over decentralization.
While this argument may be counter-intuitive at …rst, it is consistent with the recent experience of multi-divisional …rms such as Unilever that have responded to increased competition by centralizing decision rights. In particular, until 1999, Unilever had a very decentralized organizational structure in which division managers had vast decision making authority. Since then, however, Unilever has gone through a series of reorganizations that have centralized authority and limited the power of division managers. Recently, Unilever Chief Executive Patrick Cescau explained these reorganizations:
"Historically, Unilever's business had been built up around highly autonomous operating companies, with their own portfolio priorities and all the resources they needed -marketing, development, supply chain -to develop their business in whatever way they saw …t. This was a highly e¤ ective way of building a truly multinational business almost 50 years before the term was invented. But it had become less suited to an increasingly globalised, competitive landscape, where battles were being fought and won with global scale and know-how, and top-down, strategically driven allocation of resources. In today's world, a hundred di¤ erent portfolio strategies run the risk of adding up to no strategy at all. It's not e¢ cient, it doesn't leverage your best assets and it doesn't build strong global positions." 1 In line with at least the spirit of our model, competition therefore favored centralization and it favored centralization because it made it more important to adapt to changes by coordinating strategies, realizing scale economies, and quickly moving resources across divisions.
Strategic Communication and the Delegation Principle: After exploring the e¤ect of competition, we then extend our main model by allowing for incentive con ‡icts and strategic communication. We …rst show that even if division managers only have an in…nitesimally small bias towards their own divisions, they typically share more information with an unbiased headquarter manager than with each other. As mentioned above, the generalist-specialist information structure that is central to our model can therefore arise endogenously, even if there are no economies to knowledge specialization or cognitive constraints.
More generally, this version of our model shows that when decisions are interdependent, the allocation of decision rights is not determined by the classic trade-o¤ between (the depth of) information and control. Instead, the allocation of decision rights is determined by the three-way trade-o¤ between the depth of information, the breath of information, and control. To demonstrate that this trade-o¤ leads to di¤erent, but intuitive, predictions than the classic one, we revisit the famous Delegation Principle, which states that decentralization is optimal provided that incentive con ‡icts are su¢ ciently small (see, for instance, Milgrom and Roberts 1992). The Delegation Principle follows naturally from the trade-o¤ between information and control and it has been shown to hold in a large number of formal models (see, for instance, Dessein 2002 , Alonso et al. 2008 , and Rantakari 2008 ). In our setting, however, the Delegation Principle fails. In particular, we show that when the division managers'own-division bias is very small, the headquarter manager's endogenous advantage in terms of breadth can outweigh the division managers'endogenous advantage in terms of depth, tipping the balance between depth, breadth, and control in favor of centralization.
This failure of the Delegation Principle is consistent with the fact that there are many organizations in which decision rights are centralized even though agents have superior information about their local conditions and incentive con ‡icts are likely to be small. Consider, for instance, the organization of Emergency Response Systems. Typically, when someone calls for an ambulance, a central dispatcher sends an ambulance to the relevant site. As observed by Milgrom and Roberts "A potential cost to centralization is unfamiliarity by call-takers with distant or remote areas."
If the ambulance drivers have superior information about their local conditions, why don't the providers of ambulance services move to a more decentralized organization? In some bicycle messenger companies, for instance, the central dispatcher simply calls out pick ups and whichever courier responds …rst gets the business. An answer is that in the case of ambulances, dispatch decisions are highly interdependent, since it is very important that the right number of ambulances arrives at each emergency in a timely fashion. To make e¢ cient dispatch decisions, it may therefore be more important to have some information about all ambulances than to have very good information about one but very little about the others. A central dispatcher with broad but shallow information may therefore be in a better position to match ambulances to emergencies than individual ambulances with their deep but narrow information.
Literature Review
Our paper builds on a growing theoretical literature in organizational economics that examines the relationship between a …rm's organizational structure and its ability to coordinate decisions across divisions and other sub-units. Coordination requires the aggregation of dispersed information but is imperfect because of physical communication constraints (Aoki 1986 2 A key argument in this literature is that a centralized structure is better at coordinating decisions, while a decentralized one is better at adapting decisions to both, the circumstances and opportunities of di¤erent sub-units and the preferences of the managers that lead them.
We add to this literature in a number of ways. First, we show that since coordination is an input into adaptation, a centralized structure can actually be better at adapting to changes than a decentralized one. Second, we show that this is the case even if there are no incentive issues. Centralization can therefore arise as the optimal organizational structure for informational reasons and not solely because of incentive issues. Third, many of the above papers, and a number of recent papers in other …elds, model the need for adaptation and coordination by assuming a particular payo¤ function. 3 In contrast, we derive the payo¤ function by explicitly modeling the production interdependencies and the variability in demand that create the need for adaptation and coordination. This approach allows us to examine the impact of the external environment of the …rm on its internal organization. Moreover, we show that some 'standard results'are not as general as they might appear. For instance, in contrast to Dessein (2002) , Alonso et al. (2008) , and Rantakari (2008) , we show that centralization may remain optimal even in the limit as the own-division bias of managers become vanishing small.
By linking the intensity of competition to the choice between centralization and decentralization, we also relate to a literature that studies the impact of competition on organizational features of …rms. Most of this literature examines how competition a¤ects managers'incentives to reduce costs both directly -for given incentive schemes -and indirectly -by changing the managers'incentive schemes (Schmidt 1997 , Raith 2003 , Vives 2008 ). Closest to us, Raith (2003) shows that the e¤ect of competition on managerial incentives depends on how it a¤ects the level and the price sensitivity of demand. In his model, an increase in price sensitivity makes low marginal costs more important and thus favors high powered incentives. Similarly, in our setting, an increase in price sensitivity makes both adaptation to demand more important and results in production decisions that are more interdependent. It therefore favors centralization. Raith (2003) and our paper therefore both identify the same channel through which competition a¤ects organizational design, but examine a di¤erent organizational design variable. 4 
The Model
A multi-divisional …rm consists of two operating divisions and one headquarters. Division j = 1; 2 produces a single good and sells it in Market j. Each division is a monopolist in its market and headquarters does not engage in any production.
The costs of Division j = 1; 2 are given by
where c 0, g 2 ( 1; 1), and q 1 and q 2 are the production levels of Divisions 1 and 2. If g > 0,
an increase in production by one division increases the average and marginal costs of the other division. Such negative cost externalities may arise, for instance, because of the utilization of common services, such as personnel and IT departments and managerial supervision and knowhow. If, instead, g < 0, then an increase in production by one division reduces the average and marginal costs of the other division. Such positive cost externalities may arise, for instance, because of learning and scale e¤ects in the production of inputs used by both divisions.
The inverse demand function in Market j = 1; 2 is given by
where b > 0 is the price sensitivity of demand jdq j =dp j j. Demand shocks 1 and 2 are independently drawn from a distribution with zero mean and variance 2 . To avoid cumbersome corner solutions, we assume that the intercept + j is always su¢ ciently large for production to take place in both markets.
Given cost functions (1) and inverse demand functions (2), pro…ts of Divisions j = 1; 2 are given by
We denote overall …rm pro…ts by (q 1 ; q 2 ) = 1 (q 1 ; q 2 ) + 2 (q 1 ; q 2 ) and expected pro…ts by
Whenever it does not cause any confusion, we simplify notation by omitting the production levels. For instance, we sometimes denote expected pro…ts simply by .
There are three managers: the headquarter manager, who is in charge of headquarters, and Division Managers 1 and 2, who are in charge of Divisions 1 and 2 respectively. The managers are risk neutral and care about overall …rm pro…ts. They di¤er, however, in terms of the information that is available to them.
In particular, we assume that the headquarter manager is a generalist with broad but shallow information while the division managers are specialists with deep but narrow information: Division as his "local information" and we denote it by loc j = (priv j , div j ). We can then measure the depth of the division managers'information with the residual variance
where the subscript d stands for "depth." Similarly, we can measure the breadth of their information with the residual variance In contrast to the division managers, the headquarter manager is equally well informed about the demand conditions in both markets. In particular, after receiving signals head 1 and head 2 , the headquarter manager's residual variance about the demand conditions in Market j = 1; 2 is given
To capture the assumption that the headquarter is a generalist and the division managers specialists, we assume that
Compared to Division Manager j = 1; 2, the headquarter manager therefore knows less about the demand conditions in Market j but more about those in Market k 6 = j.
To model the …rm's organizational choice, we assume that the two goods that the …rm produces are so complex that they cannot be fully described in a written contract, neither ex ante nor ex post. 5 Note that this also rules out contracts on the price and the quantity of the goods. The only organizational choice that the …rm can make is therefore the allocation of decision rights. We focus on three organizational structures: Centralization, Divisional Centralization, and Decentralization. Under Centralization both production decisions q 1 and q 2 are made by the headquarter manager and under Divisional Centralization they are both made by Division Manager 1. Under Decentralization, in contrast, production decisions q 1 and q 2 are made by Division Managers 1 and 2 respectively.
Finally, the timing is as follows. First, decision rights are allocated to maximize expected pro…ts. Second, the managers learn their information. Third, the decision makers decide on the production levels. Finally, pro…ts are realized and the game ends.
Before we move on to solve this model, it is useful to discuss some of the main assumptions.
One key assumption is that the division managers' information is taken as given. Implicitly we are therefore ruling out e¢ cient communication between the division managers. We endogenize communication and thus the information structure in Section 6.
Another key assumption is that managers only care about overall …rm pro…ts. We abstract from incentive con ‡icts to focus on the role of information in the managers'ability to adapt to demand shocks. Notice also that the absence of incentive con ‡icts makes it less likely for a centralized organization to outperform the decentralized one, which is our main result.
Throughout the paper we assume that the demand shocks in the two markets are independent.
In principle we could allow for the demand shocks to be correlated. Doing so, however, would only obscure the di¤erence between depth and breadth that is at heart of our results. We therefore deliberately focus on independent demand shocks.
Another assumption that we maintain throughout the paper is that the externalities the divisions impose on each other are on the cost rather than the demand side. Notice, however, that the pro…t functions (3) could be generated in a model with constant marginal costs and linear demand functions in which the two goods are imperfect substitutes or complements. A model with demand externalities of this type is therefore identical to ours.
Finally, given our focus on cost externalities, it is natural to assume that the decision makers set quantities and not prices. Notice, however, that since the divisions are monopolists, setting prices is equivalent to setting quantities. Moreover, since we allow for both positive and negative cost externalities, the production decisions can be either strategic complements or substitutes.
Adaptation and the Depth and Breadth of Information
We now solve for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the model. In the …rst three sub-sections we examine decision making, adaptation, and the …rm's performance under Decentralization. In the …nal sub-section we then derive the expected pro…ts under the two centralized structures and determine the optimal organizational structure.
Decision Making
Suppose that the …rm is decentralized. After the division managers have observed their signals, they then simultaneously decide on the production levels that maximize expected pro…ts. By taking expectations over pro…ts (3) and di¤erentiating, we …nd that the reaction functions are given by
and
where t gb and where div = (div 1 ; div 2 ) are the signals that are observed by both division managers. To make the right decision, each division manager therefore has to predict both his local demand conditions and the decision that the other division manager is going to make. His ability to do so, however, depends on di¤erent types of information. In particular, while his ability to predict his local demand conditions depends on the depth of his information, his ability to predict the other decision depends on its breadth.
In what follows, the parameter t plays an important role. Notice that the sign of t determines whether the production decisions are strategic complements or substitutes and that the absolute value of t measures the degree of interdependence between the production decisions. It is immediate that the degree of interdependence depends on the cost term g: the larger jgj, the larger the e¤ect that an increase in production by one division has on the costs of the other, and thus the more interdependent the production decisions. What is maybe less obvious, but is important for what follows, is that the degree of interdependence jtj is also increasing in the price sensitivity of demand by a change in production by Division 2 -on Division 1's optimal production level. Essentially, the more price sensitive demand for a good, the smaller the e¤ect of a change in production on its price and thus the larger the optimal change in production in response to a change in the good's marginal costs. Next we can solve reaction functions (4) and (5) to …nd the decision rules
Notice that we are abusing notation somewhat by using q 1 and q 2 to denote both the production levels and the decision rules. The …rst term on the RHS of each expression is the average production
The second term is then the di¤erence between actual and average production and thus captures the extent to which division managers adapt to demand shocks. Since the division managers are unbiased, they always make the …rst best decision on average. The …rm's performance therefore depends only on how well the division managers adapt to demand shocks.
Adaptation
To examine how the division managers adapt to demand shocks, suppose that there is a positive demand shock in Market 1 but not in Market 2. In particular, suppose that 1 = for some > 0 and 2 = 0. Also, and without loss of generality, suppose that there are negative cost externalities, that is, g > 0 (and thus t gb > 0).
Consider now the …rst best benchmark in which the division managers are perfectly informed about the demand conditions in the two markets. It follows from (6) and (7) that, relative to the average production level, Division Manager 1 should increase production by
and Division Manager 2 should reduce production by
First best adaptation is also illustrated in Figure 3 , where the solid lines are the reaction functions (4) and (5) (8) and (9) then correspond to a move from A to C in the …gure.
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Notice that the overall changes in production are the sum of two components. The …rst component is the change in production by Division Manager 1, holding constant the decision by Division Manager 2. It is given by the …rst term on the RHS of (8) and it corresponds to a move from A to B in Figure 2 . Since this component does not require any coordination between the division managers, it captures the notion of "autonomous adaptation" that we discussed in the Introduction. The second component is then the additional change in production that is due to each division manager adapting production by his division to changes in production by the other, and thus captures the notion of "coordinated adaptation." It is given by the second term on the RHS of (8) and the only term on the RHS of (9) and it corresponds to a move from B to C in Figure 2 .
If the production decisions were independent, that is, if t = 0, coordinated adaptation would be zero. To achieve …rst best adaptation, it would then be su¢ cient for Division Manager 1 to adapt to the demand shock autonomously. Since the production decisions are interdependent, however, …rst best adaptation also requires the division managers to coordinate their production decisions.
In particular, since t > 0, autonomous adaptation by Division Manager 1 increases Division 2's marginal costs, which then requires Division Manager 2 to reduce production. This reduction in production in turn reduces the marginal costs of Division 1, which allows Division Manager 1 to further increase production, and so on.
The decomposition of the overall change in production into autonomous and coordinated adaptation highlights a key observation: in our setting, there is no trade-o¤ between coordination and adaptation; instead, coordination is an input into adaptation that allows the division managers to adapt to demand shocks more aggressively. Moreover, the more interdependent the production decisions, the more important coordinated adaptation becomes relative to autonomous adaptation.
To see this, notice that Division Manager 1's coordinated response -the second term on the RHS of (8) -is the product of his autonomous response and the "coordination multiplier"t 2 =(1 t 2 ) and observe that this coordination multiplier is increasing in jtj. The larger jtj, therefore, the larger Division Manager 1's coordinated response relative to his autonomous response.
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This last observation is also illustrated in Figures 4a and 4b , where the downward sloping lines are again the division managers'reaction functions (4) and (5). In Figure 4a these reaction functions are drawn for a smaller g (and thus a smaller t gb) and in Figure 4b they are drawn for a larger g. The …gures show that while autonomous adaptation is the same for either value of g, coordinated adaptation is larger, the larger g. The more interdependent the production decisions, therefore, the more adaptation depends on the division managers' ability to adapt to demand shocks in a coordinated fashion than to adapt to them autonomously.
We can now compare …rst best adaptation to how the division managers adapt to demand shocks when they are imperfectly informed about the demand conditions. From (6) and (7) it follows that the expected changes in production are then given by
where the …rst term on the RHS of (10) captures autonomous adaptation by Division Manager 1 and the remaining terms on the RHS of (10) and (11) capture coordinated adaptation by both division managers. These expressions show that Division Manager 1's ability to adapt to demand shocks autonomously depends on how much he knows about the demand conditions in his own market, while both division managers' ability to adapt in a coordinated fashion depends on how much they know about each others'markets. The division managers'ability to adapt to demand shocks therefore depends on both the depth and the breadth of their information. Moreover, the more interdependent the production decisions, the more important breadth rather than depth.
Organizational Performance
The decision rules q 1 and q 2 in (6) and (7) are linear in the conditional expectations. We can therefore write expected pro…ts (q 1 ; q 2 ) as
where the …rst term on the RHS are the "rigid pro…ts" and the second term are the "gains from adaptation." Rigid pro…ts are the …rm's expected pro…ts if it does not adapt production to demand shocks and always makes the average decisions q. The gains from adaptation are then the additional pro…ts that the …rm expects to realize if it does adapt production to demand shocks. We can write the gains from adaptation as
As one would expect, the gains from adaptation therefore depend on the extent to which production by each division covaries with local demand conditions. In line with our observation that coordination is an input into adaptation, however, the gains from adaptation also depend on the extent to which the production decisions covary with each other. And …nally, since pro…ts are concave in production, the gains from adaptation are decreasing in the variability of each production decision.
As a benchmark, suppose …rst that the division managers are perfectly informed about the demand conditions in both markets. First best expected pro…ts are then given by
where q 1 and q 2 are the …rst best decision rules and where the two terms on the RHS are the rigid pro…ts and the gains from adaptation. Note that the gains from adaptation are increasing in the variability of demand as measured by the variance 2 . To the extent that the …rm can adapt production to demand shocks, it therefore bene…ts from more demand variability. Moreover, the more price sensitive demand, that is, the larger b, the more the …rm bene…ts from demand variability. This re ‡ects the standard intuition that the more price sensitive demand, the more important it becomes for the …rm to adapt production to demand shocks. We will return to this intuition when we discuss competition below.
We can now compare expected pro…ts to …rst best. Recall that since the division managers are unbiased, they always make the …rst best decision on average. Relative to …rst best, the …rm's performance therefore depends only on how well division managers adapt to demand shocks.
Substituting the decision rules (6) and (7) into the pro…t function and taking expectations we …nd
where the second term on the RHS is the discrepancy between the …rst best and the actual gains from adaptation. This expression re ‡ects our two key insights from the previous section. First, the division managers'ability to adapt to demand shocks depends on both the depth and the breadth of their information. As we saw in the previous section, depth matters because it determines the decision makers'ability to adapt to demand shocks autonomously and breadth matters because it determines their ability to adapt to demand shocks in a coordinated fashion. Second, the more interdependent the production decisions, the more important the division managers' ability to adapt in a coordinated fashion -and thus the breadth of their information -relative to their ability to adapt to demand shocks autonomously -and thus the depth of their information. Indeed, the weight on the breadth of information in the above expression is equal to the coordination multiplier in (8).
The Optimal Organizational Structure
So far we have focused on Decentralization. Since the organizational structures only di¤er in terms of the decision makers'information, however, we can use the expressions we derived above to characterize the two centralized organizations. Consider, for instance, Centralization, in which case both decisions are made by the headquarter manager. Since the headquarter manager only receives one signal for each market, we can derive her decision rules under this structure by substituting head j for both loc j and div j in the decision rules (6) and (7) . Similarly, we can obtain expected pro…ts by substituting V for both V d and V b in (15) . The di¤erence in expected pro…ts between Centralization and Decentralization are therefore given by
where "C"and "D"indicate "Centralization"and "Decentralization." The two terms in the squared brackets represent the costs and bene…ts of decentralization: on the one hand, the division managers know more about their markets and are therefore better at adapting to demand shocks autonomously; on the other hand, however, the headquarter manager knows more than each division manager does about the other market and is therefore better at coordinating her responses. As anticipated, the costs of decentralization outweigh the bene…ts if the degree of interdependence is su¢ ciently large. Indeed, no matter how large the division manager's advantage in terms of depth V V d > 0, and how small the headquarter manager's advantage in terms of breadth
there exists a critical level of interdependence above which the centralized structure is better at adapting to demand shocks than the decentralized one.
Consider next Divisional Centralization. We can obtain the decision rules under this organizational structure by substituting loc 1 for div 1 and div 2 for loc 2 in the decision rules (6) and (7).
Moreover, it is routine to show that expected pro…ts are given by
where "DC" stands for Divisional Centralization. The …rst term on the RHS of this expression is the ine¢ ciency that arises in Division 1 because q 1 is not e¢ ciently adapted to 1 and the second term is the ine¢ ciency that arises in Division 2 because q 2 is not e¢ ciently adapted to 2 . The di¤erence in expected pro…ts between Decentralization and Divisional Centralization is then given
As in the comparison between Centralization and Decentralization, therefore, the centralized structure, in this case Divisional Centralization, outperforms the decentralized one if the production decisions are su¢ ciently interdependent. Since the division managers don't di¤er in terms of the depth and breadth of their information, however, the di¤erence in the residual variances now does not a¤ect the choice between the two organizational structures.
The only remaining issue then is the choice between Centralization and Divisional Centralization. From (16) and (18), the di¤erence in expected pro…ts between these two organizational structures is given by
Once again, therefore, Centralization outperforms the alternative, in this case Divisional Centralization, if the headquarter manager's advantage in terms of breadth outweighs the division managers' advantage in terms of depth. The degree of interdependence, however, now does not a¤ect the choice between the two organizational structures. The reason is that neither organizational structure has an unambiguous advantage in terms of autonomous or coordinated adaptation. Instead, the headquarter manager is better at adapting q 2 to 2 -both because she is better at adapting to demand shocks in Market 2 autonomously and because she is better at coordinating changes in q 1 with changes in q 2 -and Manager 1 is better at adapting q 1 to 1 -both because he is better adapting to demand shocks in Market 1 autonomously and because he is better at coordinating changes in q 2 with changes in q 1 . Centralization therefore outperforms Divisional Centralization if and only if the headquarter manager's advantage in terms of breadth outweighs the division manager's advantage in terms of depth, that is, if and only if
An interpretation of this condition is that there are decreasing returns to knowledge specialization, which is a feature of most commonly used information technologies, such as drawing independent signals to learn about a random variable. 6 For the remainder of this paper, we therefore assume that (19) holds and abstract from Divisional Centralization. Notice, however, that even if (19) does not hold, it is still the case that a centralized structure outperforms the decentralized one if the production decisions are su¢ ciently interdependent. The only di¤erence is that the centralized structure then refers to Divisional Centralization rather than Centralization and that the critical degree of interdependence does not depend on the depth and the breadth of the decision makers'information. We can now summarize the previous discussion in our main proposition.
and Decentralization is optimal otherwise. If (19) does not hold, then Divisional Centralization is optimal if t 2 1 t 2 > 1 and Decentralization is optimal otherwise.
As anticipated, a centralized structure is better at adapting to changes in the environment than a decentralized one when decisions are su¢ ciently interdependent. As such, the model sheds 
Competition and Adaptation
To explore some of the implications of the result we derived in the previous section, we now examine the e¤ect of an increase in competition on the …rm's organizational structure. As discussed in the Introduction, we argue that an increase in competition does not only make adaptation more important. Instead, it also changes how a …rm adapts to demand shocks, putting relatively more weight on coordinated adaptation than on autonomous adaptation. As a result, an increase in competition actually favors a centralized structure over a decentralized one.
In general, there are many channels through which competition can a¤ect the behavior of …rms.
In line with much of the Industrial Organization literature and, in particular, the literature on the e¤ect of competition on the power of managerial incentives and innovation, we focus on the e¤ect of competition on demand (see, for instance, Raith 2003 and Vives 2008) . It is well known that an increase in competition can shift …rms' inverse demand functions downwards, or it can make demand more price sensitive, or both (Vives 2008) . In this section, we therefore explore how the di¤erence in expected pro…ts between Centralization and Decentralization depend on the average intercept of the inverse demand functions and on the price sensitivity of demand b. In Appendix A we then provide micro-foundations for this reduced-form approach by modeling competition explicitly and con…rming that -depending on its underlying causes -competition either reduces , increases b, or both.
From the previous section it is immediate that a reduction in alone does not a¤ect the di¤erence in expected pro…ts between Centralization and Decentralization (16) . Such a reduction does diminish the …rm's rigid pro…ts. But since rigid pro…ts are equal to …rst best under both organizational structures it does not a¤ect their relative performance. In our setting, an increase in competition can therefore only a¤ect the …rm's organization if it makes demand more price sensitive.
Consider then the e¤ect of an increase in the price sensitivity of demand b. Di¤erentiating the di¤erence in expected pro…ts (16) we have that
where the …rst term on the RHS is the "direct e¤ect" and the second is the "indirect e¤ect"
that works through t. The direct e¤ect captures the standard intuition that an increase the price sensitivity of demand makes adaptation more important and thus favors the organizational structure that is better at adapting to demand shocks. In particular, it follows from (16) that we can write the direct e¤ect as
The direct e¤ect therefore magni…es the di¤erence in expected pro…ts between the two organizational structures. Notice, however, that it does not a¤ect the di¤erence in expected pro…ts for a marginal …rm that is just indi¤erent between Centralization and Decentralization. As such, the direct e¤ect does not a¤ect the choice between the two organizational structures. This choice therefore depends only on the indirect e¤ect of an increase in the price sensitivity.
To understand the indirect e¤ect, recall that an increase in the price sensitivity of demand b increases the degree of interdependence jtj = jgbj. From our discussion above, it then immediately follows that an increase in the price sensitivity favors coordinated adaptation and breadth over autonomous adaptation and depth. Formally, the indirect e¤ect is given by
For a marginal …rm, the overall e¤ect of an increase on the price sensitivity of demand is then to make the centralized structure strictly more pro…table than the decentralized one. We therefore have the following proposition. however, is conceptually di¤erent from the allocation of decision rights between headquarters and division managers. In particular, division managers typically have responsibility for sales, marketing, engineering, and manufacturing and report to a group manager or a Chief Operating O¢ cer (COO) who has responsibility for multiple divisions. 7 The role of the group manager or COO is thus equivalent to that of headquarters in our model. 8 
Strategic Communication and the Delegation Principle
In this section we extend our main model by allowing for incentive con ‡icts and strategic communication. As discussed in the Introduction, we use this version of the model for two purposes. First, we use it to show that strategic communication can give rise to the generalist-specialist information structure that is central to our model, even when there are neither economies to knowledge specialization nor cognitive constraints. Second, we show that once we allow for incentive con ‡icts, the optimal allocation of decision rights is determined by the three-way trade-o¤ between the depth of information, the breadth of information, and control. We then demonstrate that this trade-o¤ gives rise to di¤erent predictions about the optimal allocation of decision rights than those arising from the classic trade-o¤ between (the depth of) information and control.
Allowing for Incentive Con ‡icts and Strategic Communication
Speci…cally, we make two changes to the model that we explored above. First, we now assume that the division managers are biased towards their own divisions. In particular, Division Manager Throughout this section, we continue to assume that the decision makers set quantities rather than prices. Since the divisions are monopolists, their pro…ts do not depend on whether decision makers set prices or quantities, as long as they have the same information in either case. It should be noted, however, that the divisions managers'incentives to misrepresent their information, and thus the amount of information that is communicated in equilibrium, does depend on whether decision Next we informally discuss the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game. The formal analysis is in Appendix B.
The Generalist-Specialist Information Structure
Consider …rst decision making for given posteriors about the demand conditions. Clearly, the division managers'bias does not a¤ect decision making under Centralization. Moreover, we can obtain the new decision rules under Decentralization by simply substituting t= (2 ) for t in the original decision rules (6) and (7). In terms of decision making, the only e¤ect of the owndivision bias is therefore to reduce the weight that the division managers put on the interdependence between their decisions. To characterize the most informative equilibrium, we …rst need to characterize the communication biases under the two organizational structures, which we do in the following lemma. LEMMA 1. Under Centralization, the communication bias always exists and is given by
If b C 1=4, informative communication is not feasible.
Under Decentralization, the communication bias exists and is given by
If ( Formally, there exists a critical value t > 0 and an " > 0 such that for 2 (1=2; 1=2 + ") we have
V < V b if and only if t < t .
This lemma is illustrated in Figure 5 , which also provides additional information about the level of t . The …gure shows that for most of the parameter space, vertical communication is more informative than horizontal communication. Part of the reason for this is straightforward:
even if the own-division bias is in…nitesimally small, a division manager has a smaller incentive to misrepresent his information when he communicates with headquarters -which cares about overall pro…ts -than when he communicates with the other division manager -who is biased towards his own division. The lemma and the …gure, however, also show that if the decisions are strategic substitutes and the interdependence is su¢ ciently strong, division managers actually share more information with each other than with headquarters. To understand why this is the case, consider …rst the division managers'incentives to misrepresent their information when they communicate with each other. If t > 0, a division manager would like to induce his counterpart to produce less. Since the decisions are strategic substitutes, this gives the division manager an incentive to over-report his local demand conditions. In a similar vein, if t < 0, a division manager would like to induce his counterpart to produce more. Since quantity choices are strategic complements, the division manager therefore again has an incentive to over-report his local demand conditions. Under Decentralization, the division managers' incentives to mis-report their information are therefore the same whether the decisions are strategic complements or substitutes.
This is not the case under Centralization, however. The key di¤erence is that under Centralization, a division manager's communication in ‡uences production in both markets. On the one hand, …xing the decision in his own market, the incentives to mis-report are similar to those under Decentralization. On the other hand, when …xing the decision in the other market, the direction of mis-reporting depends on whether decisions are strategic complements or substitutes. In particular, if t > 0, a division manager would like the headquarter manager to produce more, which induces him to over-report his private information. If t < 0, in contrast, a division manager would like the headquarter manager to produce less, which induces him to underreport his private information.
For t < 0 the division manager therefore faces countervailing incentives when communicating with the headquarter manager. When t > 0, however, his incentives to mis-report his information are reinforcing each other. In summary, vertical communication is actually less informative than horizontal communication when the decisions are strategic substitutes and the interdependence is su¢ ciently strong.
The Failure of the Delegation Principle
The next question is whether the headquarter manager's endogenous advantage in terms of breadth can outweigh the division managers'endogenous advantage in terms of depth. With biased division managers, the di¤erence in expected pro…ts is given by
The …rst term on the RHS of this expression is the di¤erence in rigid pro…ts while the second and third terms are the di¤erence in the gains from adaptation. Since the division managers'average decisions are ine¢ cient, the di¤erence in the rigid pro…ts is always negative. Similarly, the …rst part of the di¤erence in the gains from adaptation is also always negative since, for any given information, the division managers adapt to demand shocks ine¢ ciently. Together the …rst two terms therefore capture the standard loss of control. The …nal term on the RHS of (23), in contrast, captures the di¤erence in the gains from adaptation that is due to di¤erences in the information that is available to the decision makers. As such it captures the standard gain in information.
When is close to 1=2, the loss of control is second order relative to the gain in information.
In the existing literature, agents have more information than the principal; as a result the gain in information is positive and thus decentralization is optimal (Dessein 2002 , Alonso et al. 2008 , Rantakari 2008 ). In our model, instead, the agents have di¤ erent, but not necessarily more, information than the principal. As a result, the gain in information can be negative, that is, decentralization can lead to a loss of information. As the next proposition shows, centralization can then be optimal. PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that the division managers' own-division bias is very small. Then Centralization outperforms Decentralization if and only if the production decisions are both strategic complements and su¢ ciently interdependent. Formally, there exists a critical value t < 0 and an " > 0 such that for 2 (1=2; 1=2 + ") we have C > D if and only if t < t .
The proposition is also illustrated in Figure 6 , which provides additional information about the level of t . To understand this proposition, …x a particular value of s= ( c) and suppose that t > t , where t is de…ned in Lemma 2. From Lemma 2 we know that if t > t , horizontal communication is more e¢ cient than vertical communication. In this case, the each division manager knows unambiguously more about the demand conditions in both markets than headquarters. As a result, we have the standard result: the gain in information is positive and dominates the loss of control. If, instead, t < t , then vertical communication is more e¢ cient than horizontal communication. As long as t > t , however, the headquarter manager's advantage in terms of breadth is small relative to the division managers'advantage in terms of depth. As a result, the gain in information is still positive and it still dominates the loss of control. If t < t , however, vertical communication is so much more informative than horizontal communication, that the headquarter manager's advantage in terms of breadth dominates the division managers'advantage in terms of depth. Centralization is then optimal, even though the incentive con ‡icts are in…nitesimally small. 
Comparison with the Existing Literature
The version of our model with endogenous communication is closely related to a number of recent papers that also examine the organization of multi-divisional …rms, in particular, Alonso et al.
(2008) and Rantakari (2008) . In spite of the similarities in the set ups, however, there are key di¤erences in the predictions and insights that follow from these models. These di¤erences are due to di¤erences in underlying pro…t function, which is assumed in the existing literature and which we derive from demand and cost functions in this paper.
Speci…cally, the existing literature assumes di¤erent variations of a pro…t functions that can be written as
where K is a constant, q 1 and q 2 are the decisions, 1 and 2 are the states, and > 0 is a parameter that measures the interdependence between the decisions. This speci…cation captures the need for decisions to be both adapted and coordinated and it has been popular beyond organizational economics (see, for instance, the references in Footnote 3). Given this pro…t function, we can write …rst best expected pro…ts as
where the …rst term on the RHS are the rigid pro…ts and the second are the gains from adaptation.
Notice that the gains from adaptation are decreasing in the degree of interdependence . There is, therefore, a trade-o¤ between coordination and adaptation: the more important coordination becomes, the less can be gained from adapting decisions to changes in the environment. This is in contrast to our setting, where an increase in the degree of interdependence increases the gains from adaptation. To see this, recall that in our model, …rst best expected pro…ts are given by
and notice that the gains from adaptation -given by the second term on the RHS -are increasing in jtj. In our setting, there is therefore no trade-o¤ between coordination and adaptation.
The di¤erences in the underlying pro…t functions also lead to key di¤erences in the models' predictions about the optimal allocation of decision rights. The central result in Alonso et al. 
Conclusions
It is widely believed that large, centralized organizations are worse at adapting to changes in the environment than small, decentralized ones. Gertner and Stillman (2001) , for instance, observe that:
"A common belief is that large bureaucratic organizations su¤ er from excess inertia and that a signi…cant advantage of small organizations is their ‡exibility and ability to adapt. Exactly why this should be so, however, is rarely explained, nor have economists developed systematic empirical evidence on the relationship between organizational structure and change" (p.418).
The purpose of this paper was to help …ll this gap and explore the relationship between organizational structure and change. We showed that even in a very standard setting, a centralized structure may actually be better at adaptation than a decentralized one and that this may be the case even when division managers have superior information about their local conditions and incentive con ‡icts are negligible. The reason is that if decisions are interdependent, an e¤ective response to a local shock requires coordinated change. If production is su¢ ciently interdependent, a headquarter manager with broad but shallow information about each market is then better able to adapt to local shocks than division managers with deep but narrow information about their respective markets. We then showed that this result reverses some of the standard intuitions about organizational structure, such as the notions that competition favors decentralization and that decentralization ought to be optimal provided that incentive con ‡icts are su¢ ciently small.
One potential application of our model are multi-national enterprises. Such …rms are often multi-divisional …rms in which each division is dedicated to a particular country. General Motors, for instance, started out as a domestic …rm that only served the US and Canadian markets. In the late 1920s, however, it became an early multi-national with di¤erent subunits producing and selling cars in England, Germany, and other markets. In recent years the role of multi-nationals in the globalized world economy has been hotly debated among the general public, policy makers, and academics (see, for instance, Navaretti and Venables 2004). While some see multi-nationals as catalysts for local economies that transfer know-how and create jobs, others view them as threats to local wealth and national identities. In spite of this debate and an accompanying surge in research on multi-nationals, little is known about what determines the horizontal size of multi-nationals. 9 When, for instance, does globalization induce multi-nationals to expand into ever more countries?
And when, instead, does it induce them to divest of some of their divisions, as in the recent breakup of DaimlerChrysler? While our model is explicitly not about the boundaries of multi-divisional …rms, it does suggest channels through which globalization may a¤ect the horizontal size of multinationals. If, for instance, competition makes adaptation more important, and adaptation is more easily achieved in centralized multi-divisional …rms than in stand-alone …rms, then competition may lead to the emergence of new and the expansion of existing multi-nationals. But if, instead, competition merely reduces externalities between competitors in the same industries, then it may limit the growth of multi-nationals and even induce them to divest of some of their divisions.
A model of the horizontal boundaries of multi-divisional …rms that could con…rm or reject these speculations awaits future research.
Appendix A: Competition and Adaptation
In this appendix, we explicitly model competition and its impact on demand and the …rm's organization. For this purpose, we make three changes to the model described in Section 3.
First, we now assume that each division faces a continuum of potential competitors. Each potential competitor consists of a single division and can only operate in one market. To enter a market, a competitor has to pay entry costs K 0. We denote the measure of competitors that enter Market j = 1; 2 by n j . To economize on notation, and without loss of generality, we set the competitors'production costs to zero.
Second, instead of simply assuming the divisions'inverse demand functions, we now derive them from the underlying parameters. For this purpose, suppose that there is a measure m of consumers in each market. The utility function of each consumer in Market j = 1; 2 is given by Finally, we need to change the timing of the game to incorporate the competitors. We continue to assume that the …rm …rst decides on its organization and that the …rm's decision makers then learn their information and decide on production levels. All potential competitors observe are the …rm's production decisions. We make no assumptions about how much the competitors know about the realization of 1 and 2 , or about the …rm's organization. Each competitor then decides whether to enter and, if so, how much to produce. Finally, pro…ts are realized and the game ends.
Once again we solve for the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of this game.
In this setting, there are three parameters that determine the degree of competition that the divisions face: the competitors'entry costs K, market size m, and the degree of substitutability .
Below we explore how changes in these parameters a¤ect the …rm's organization.
Organization and the Firm' s Performance
We solve the game by backward induction, starting with the competitors' production and entry decisions. Then, given the competitors' behavior, we can derive the divisions' inverse residual demand functions. We summarize this result in the next lemma.
LEMMA A1. Division j = 1; 2's residual inverse demand function is given by 
Proof: We start by deriving the competitors'production and entry decisions. Suppose that the …rm has made production decisions q 1 and q 2 and that measures n 1 and n 2 of competitors have entered the respective markets. The inverse demand function faced by competitor k 2 [0; n j ] in Market j = 1; 2 is given by
where Q j = R n j 0 q jk dk is the total amount produced by the competitors in Market j: Each competitor determines their quantity choice by solving max q jk p jk q jk , taking as given production of the …rm and the other competitors. The …rst order condition is given by q jk = m q j Q j :
Note that this condition does not depend on j . It is therefore irrelevant whether the competitors observe j or not. Next we integrate over all n j competitors to …nd that the total amount produced by the competitors in Market j is given by
Any competitor k that enters Market j thus produces
and realizes pro…ts
Finally, setting jk equal to zero and solving for n j we …nd that a measure
of competitors enters Market j. The residual inverse demand function of Division j = 1; 2 characterizes demand for its good given the competitors'behavior. Substituting the competitors'total production (27) in Division j's inverse demand (26), we …nd that Division j's residual inverse demand is given by (24) and (25).
The E¤ect of Competition on Organization
In contrast to our main model, the average intercept of the inverse demand functions and the slope parameter b are now functions of the underlying parameters. It follows from (24) and (25) that a reduction in the competitors'entry costs K reduces the average intercept but does not affect the price sensitivity of demand. In contrast, an increase in market size m or in the degree of substitutability , leads to an anti-clockwise rotation of the residual inverse demand functions.
In other words, such changes in the environment reduce the average intercept and increase the price sensitivity. The e¤ect of changes in these parameters on the optimal organizational structure is summarized in Proposition A1 that translates the …ndings in Proposition 2 to our speci…c competition model. PROPOSITION A1. a. A reduction in entry costs K has no e¤ ect on the choice between Centralization and Decentralization.
b. There exists a critical value of the degree of substitutability > 0 and a critical value of the entry costs K > 0 such that for any and K K , an increase in market size m can result in a shift from Decentralization to Centralization but never the reverse.
c. There exists a critical value of the degree of substitutability < 1 such that for any an increase in the degree of substitutability can result in a shift from Decentralization to Centralization but never the reverse.
Proof: Follows from Proposition 1 and our previous discussion of the e¤ect of parameter changes on (24) and (25).
Appendix B: Strategic Communication and the Delegation Principle
We divide the proofs for Section 6 into three appendices. Appendix B1 characterizes communication equilibria and provides the proof of Lemma 1 while Appendix B2 derives expressions for the quality of horizontal and vertical communication and provides the proof of Lemma 2. Appendix B3 uses the previous results to study the relative performance of Centralization and Decentralization when the own-division bias is vanishingly small and presents the proof of Proposition 3. . Finally, the belief functions are denoted by g j ( j j m j ) for j = 1; 2 and characterize the receiver's posterior probability of state j conditional on receiving message m j .
Appendix B1 -Communication Equilibria
We focus on Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the communication subgame which require that communication rules are optimal for the division managers given decision rules. Formally, whenever
where l j and l k are, respectively, the pro…ts of Divisions j and k, j 6 = k; given that decisions are made according to q l 1 ( ) and q l 2 ( ). Perfect Bayesian Equilibria also require that the decision rules are optimal for the decision makers given the belief functions. Thus, under Centralization q C 1 ( ) and q C 2 ( ) solve
Finally, Perfect Bayesian Equilibria require that the belief functions are derived from the communication rules using Bayes' rule whenever possible, that is,
PROPOSITION B1. For 2 (1=2; 1] and t 6 = 0 there exists an integer N ( ; t), such that for all N N ( ; t) there exists at least one equilibrium ( 1 ( ) 2 ( ) ; q 1 ( ); q 2 ( ); g 1 ( ); g 2 ( )), where a. (22) d. q j (m) = q C j ; j = 1; 2; under Centralization, where q C j are given by (29) and (30) 
It is readily seen that
This implies that for any two di¤erent posterior expectations of the headquarter manager, say 1 < 1 , there is at most one type of Manager 1 that is indi¤erent between both. Now suppose that contrary to the assertion of interval equilibria there are two states For the case of Decentralization let 1 ( ) and 2 ( ) be communication rules of Manager 1 and Manager 2, respectively. Sequential rationality implies that in equilibrium decision rules must conform toq
where 1 denotes Manager 2's posterior expectation over 1 : It can readily be seen that
0 and the proof follows as in the preceding paragraph.
We now characterize all equilibria of the communication game. For this purpose for Manager j = 1; 2 let a j be a partition of [ s; s], any message m j 2 (a j;i 1 ; a j;i ) be denoted by m j;i , and m j;i be the receiver's posterior belief of the expected value of j after receiving message m j;i : a. Centralization: The expected utility of Manager 1 in state a 1;i is given by
In state a 1;i Manager 1 must be indi¤erent between sending a message that induces a posterior 
where q D 1 and q D 2 are given by (31) and (32) . In state 1 = a 1;i this can be written as
Appendix B2 -Residual Variance of Communication
In this appendix we …rst derive closed form expressions for the residual variance under Centralization and Decentralization. We then prove that these residual variances possess some smoothness properties that enables us to characterize their behavior for close to 1/2. We conclude by comparing the informativeness of vertical and horizontal communication.
Centralization
Under Centralization the communication bias is constant, as in the leading example in Crawford and Sobel (1982) . Thus, for a given equilibrium with n intervals the residual variance of communication
The maximum number of intervals N (b C ) satis…es 2N (b C )(N (b C ) 1)jb C j 2s and is thus given by
where int(z) is the largest integer that does not exceed z. Therefore if b C < s 2 the residual variance the communication under Centralization is
Decentralization
Under Decentralization the communication bias takes the form 
with boundary conditions a 1;0 = s and a 1;n = s. Solving this second order linear di¤erence equation we obtain
where The solution to this quadratic inequality is
It follows that N (b 1 ; b 2 ) is given by
Residual Variance We next compute the residual variance of communication for a communication equilibrium with n intervals, n 2. The variance of the message m 1 to Manager 2 is
And the residual variance on an n partition equilibrium is
We next compute a 1;i a 1;i 1 (a 1;i a 1;i 1 ) : From (36) and the size of each interval (37) we have
From the sum of a geometric series
x ki = x k 1 r k 1 x k we can simplify the summation of the previous terms to obtain
To further simplify this expression we …rst note that which, substituted into (39) yields
Substituting this expression into V D n and after some simpli…cations we have
where r = x n . Therefore the residual variance of communication is given by
Absolute Continuity of Residual Variances
The residual variance V l ; l = fC; Dg is continuous in the own-division bias ; although nondi¤erentiable whenever the number of intervals in the most informative communication equilibrium changes value. As the number of intervals tends to in…nity when managers become more aligned with each other, the residual variance has an in…nite number of points of discontinuity in every neighborhood of = 1=2. Nevertheless, the next lemma shows that V l retains certain smoothness properties that allows us to characterize its behavior in a neighborhood of = 1=2 through the function @V l =@ :
LEMMA B1. The residual variance of communication V l ; l = fC; Dg is an absolutely continuous function of 2 [1=2; 1] with a well-de…ned limit @V l =@ as tends to 1=2. In particular,
Proof: The function V l ; l = fC; Dg ; is continuous and increasing in and its derivative is de…ned except for a countable number of points. To establish absolute continuity of V l we need to further show that (i.) its derivative is integrable, and (ii.) V l maps sets of measure zero into sets of measure zero (Luzin N property; see Rudin 1986 ). Since the set of points of non-di¤erentiability of V l is countable it follows readily that V l satis…es the Luzin N property (see Leoni 2009 ). We will now show that @V l =@ is bounded in [1=2; 1], whenever de…ned, and this will establish integrability.
First, the case of Centralization. Di¤erentiating (34) we obtain
where the last inequality follows from the de…nition of N (b C ). Therefore we obtain the uniform
We now show that @V C =@ approaches a well-de…ned limit as ! 1=2: From the previous bound we have
Given that b C = (2 1) ( c) we readily have that 
To guarantee that @V D =@ is bounded we now show that it approaches a …nite limit as ! 1=2. With these limits applied to (42) 
Therefore the limit of the total derivative as the own-division bias vanishes is
which is bounded for jtj < 1. This establishes that @V D =@ is bounded and thus integrable. Proof: As V l ; l = fC; Dg are absolutely continuous the fundamental theorem of calculus holds (Rudin 1987 ) and we have that
Since both Centralization and Decentralization achieve full revelation of information for = 1=2, if lim !1=2 @ V C V D =@ > 0 it follows that there exists an " > 0 such that
The last claim of the corollary follows from an equivalent argument.
Informativeness of Vertical and Horizontal Communication
Proof of Lemma 2: Proposition B1 derives the expressions for b C and b D . We …rst note that, on average, the absolute value of the communication bias is larger under Decentralization. As shown in Proposition B1, a necessary condition for informative horizontal communication is that 1 2 < 1:
Therefore, whenever b D is well de…ned we have
The We note that max 1=2 1 1 ( 2 + + 3 + 1) = 2 (t + 2) (1 t) 2 :
Since the restriction to positive quantities requires ( c)=s > (1 + t)=(1 t), and (1 + t)=(1 t) > , then there exists an " > 0 such that for 2 (1=2; 1=2 + ") horizontal communication is more informative than vertical.
Appendix B3 -Relative Performance
We now turn to comparing the relative performance of Centralization and Decentralization for a vanishing small own-division bias. We start with a technical lemma that translates the smoothness properties of V l ; l = fC; Dg derived in Lemma B1 to the comparison of pro…ts under both organizational structures.
LEMMA B2. The di¤ erence in performance C D is an absolutely continuous function of :
The limit @ C D =@ as tends to 1=2 exists and, if its positive, there exists an " > 0 such that C > D for 2 (1=2; 1=2 + "), while if it is negative then there exists an " > 0 such that C < D for 2 (1=2; 1=2 + "): The last claim follows in a similar fashion from an equivalent argument.
The previous analysis showed that vertical communication is more informative than horizontal communication whenever t < 0. We now show that this communication advantage may be su¢ cient for the organization to move to a centralized structure even for a vanishing small con ‡ict.
Proof of Proposition 2:
The di¤erence C D in the performance of Centralization and Decentralization is given by (23) and the limit of the rate of change of this di¤erence is
From Lemma B2, Centralization dominates Decentralization for close to 1=2 if lim !1=2 @ C D =@ > 0; which translates to
Using the limits (41) and (43) 
